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REANIMATING THE FOREIGN COMPACTS CLAUSE
THOMAS LIEFKE EATON*
INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2019,1 the United States Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) filed a complaint against the State of California “for unlawfully
entering a cap and trade agreement with the Canadian Providence of
Quebec.”2 In many ways, the complaint reflects a conventional disagree-
ment between states and the federal government over the contours of
federalism, but the complaint’s second cause of action, alleging a viola-
tion of the “Compacts Clause,” Article I, section 10(3) of the United States
Constitution,3 is unique. The body of law and scholarship surrounding the
Compacts Clause is often guesswork at best, for jurists and scholars alike,
because typically states’ practice is not to seek congressional consent, and
Congress’s, to rarely consider granting or denying it. Further, Congress
has only explicitly rejected one state-made compact in its history.4
Federal litigation challenges to agreements made by states are
even more uncommon.5 While still limited, the vast majority of litigation
* The author is a Judge Advocate in the United States Navy. The views expressed in this
writing are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the Department of the
Navy or the United States Government. The author would like to thank Breawna Power
Eaton for reading numerous drafts, providing excellent feedback, and for putting up with
him generally. He would also like to thank the faculty of The Fletcher School, particularly
Professor Michael Glennon, for all of their incredible support.
1 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, United States v. California, No.
2:19-cv-02142 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
2 Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States Files Lawsuit Against
State of California for Unlawful Cap and Trade Agreement with the Canadian Province of
Quebec (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-lawsuit-against
-state-california-unlawful-cap-and-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/5ZTV-UZ2S].
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
4 See Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1078 n.33
(2008) [hereinafter Hollis I] (“granting consent to a Great Lakes Basin Compact but limiting
it to U.S. state participation and not including provisions authorizing recommendations
to the federal governments on treaties and agreements”).
5 See MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE
MYTHOFNATIONALEXCLUSIVITY 284–85 (2016). The terms “compacts” and “agreements”
will be used interchangeably throughout this writing. The courts have noted, accurately,
that the drafters must have certainly intended some distinction between the terms
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is initiated by private parties.6 And when Congress does consider com-
pacts made by states (also de minimis),7 they usually concern agreements
made between two or more states, referred to as “interstate” agreements.8
A truly rarified species, though, is a direct federal legal challenge to an
agreement under the second group in the Compacts Clause, concerning
compacts made between states and foreign governments,9 referred to as
“foreign state agreements” (“FSAs”).10
Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution directs, “no
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State, or foreign Power.”11 While the body
of law and scholarship concerning both interstate agreements and FSAs
is limited,12 authors have not unreasonably assumed that the test for
interstate agreements, originating from Virginia v. Tennessee,13 applies
to FSAs as well, but the Supreme Court has never explicitly held so.14
While Article I, section 10 is parallel in construction for both types
of agreements, the potential harm each type of agreement poses is ac-
tually quite different.15 Therefore, the courts should see not one unitary
“compacts” and “agreements” versus “treaties” because of the separate process for approval
for compacts and agreements differing from that of treaties, but stated that “[w]hatever
distinct meanings the Framers attributed to the terms in Art. I, § 10, those meanings
were soon lost.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1978).
However, this distinction between treaties and compacts must be explored and considered
separately, because of the differing scope of executive powers in each area.
6 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 155–56
(2d ed. 1996).
7 Hollis I, supra note 4, at 1083.
8 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 281.
9 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 155–56. “[O]rdinarily the state’s judgment would not be re-
viewed unless some aggrieved private interest challenged the agreement.”
10 The origin of the term “FSA” appears to be Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact
Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 742 (2010) [hereinafter Hollis II].
The Supreme Court has only considered an FSA once: Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
540, 549–51, 569–70 (1840). See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 153. I have found no case in
which the Executive Branch, until this complaint, has ever before directly challenged in
court an FSA for lack of congressional consent.
11 U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
12 Andrew A. Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States with One Another and with
Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L. REV. 500, 501 (1918) (“So far as the supreme court of the
nation is concerned, we have but little more than dicta to guide us in the determination
of these questions.”) (discussing if congressional approval is required for FSAs).
13 148 U.S. 503, 525 (1893); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 282.
14 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 289.
15 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 769–70.
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Compacts Clause, but two: the more developed interstate Compacts Clause
and the less well-defined “Foreign” Compacts Clause.16
Positive or negative federal action under the Foreign Compacts
Clause, either by Congress or the President, is so rare that most scholars
accurately describe the Foreign Compacts Clause as having “fallen into
desuetude.”17 Professor Sharmila Murthy, in her analysis of the suit,
quickly dismisses the strength of DOJ’s Compacts Clause argument,
asserting that, under the single Compacts Clause theory, “[m]ost experts
believe that the functional test developed for interstate compacts applies
to cross-border agreements.”18 Murthy concludes that the President “does
not have the constitutional authority to end the Cap-and-Trade Agree-
ment with Quebec.”19 The District Court agreed on both counts, as argued
by both the State of California, as well as amici,20 Judge William Shubb,
in his March 12, 2020, ruling, which adopted this commonly advanced
view of a singular compacts clause, with the test from Virginia and its
progeny controlling.21 But before reaching that conclusion, Judge Shubb
concluded that the “agreement” was not a compact, stating “‘classic indi-
cia’ . . . from Northeast Bancorp are missing.”22 Later, in separate mo-
tions, Judge Shubb further dismissed the DOJ’s arguments, finding the
Cap-and-Trade Agreement did not violate Foreign Affairs Doctrine
preemptions.23 For the sake of the current matter, California’s attempt
to do something in the face of the disjointed, ineffective federal response
to climate change, the result appears desirable, but I am skeptical that
the current Supreme Court will take a similar view, or that the result is
most favorable where unified national (not to mention international)
action is required.
16 Id. at 769.
17 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 289.
18 Sharmila Murthy, California’s Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec: Surviving Con-




20 Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Foreign Relations Law at 1–2, United States v.
California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020).
21 Memorandum and Order Re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 18, 22, 33,
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020) [hereinafter
March 12th Ruling].
22 Id. at 28.
23 Memorandum and Order Re: Second Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 29–30,
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020).
32 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:29
While likely apocryphally attributed to the eminently quotable
Yogi Berra, it remains true that “it’s tough to make predictions, espe-
cially about the future.”24 However, if the current litigation reaches the
Supreme Court, it seems likely that the Court will reanimate the disused
requirement of congressional consent and find the current agreement
between California and Quebec to be violative of the Foreign Compacts
Clause. Strong textual arguments will be appealing to the current Court.
Likewise attractive is the expansive view of the President’s power in
foreign affairs, possible federal preemption in the form of environmental
protection legislation,25 and the distinguishability of precedent for inter-
state agreements from FSAs. The current Court is unlikely to adopt a
rule that is so clearly the opposite of the words in the Constitution. The
upcoming presidential election will affect whether the federal govern-
ment appeals. For now, the DOJ is “considering [their] next steps.”26
If appealed, the current litigation should force answers to a number
of important questions the Supreme Court has left unresolved: 1) Has fed-
eral inaction led the Foreign Compacts Clause to lose all (or almost all)
of its meaning?; 2) Is there a separate standard for interstate agreements
versus FSAs?; and, 3) If there is a separate standard, what should it be?
While certainly in overwhelming disuse, both congressional
powers to approve or disapprove compacts made by states, and the
executive’s ability to challenge agreements that encroach on presidential
powers, are available to both Congress and the President. Congress clearly
retains the power to disapprove agreements.27 But the President should
be able to successfully challenge agreements that encroach upon plenary
powers of the President, as well as agreements that infringe on authorities
delegated to the executive by Congress. Delegation by Congress should
function as disapproval of the agreement and be viewed as a form of federal
preemption.28 Finally, California most likely has the ability to moot the
current litigation by executing a new “understanding” with Quebec that
24 The Perils of Prediction, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007.
25 The application of federal preemption issues will be beyond the scope of this writing,
however, as I will discuss below, congressional legislation delegating discretion to the
executive should act as an effective disapproval of an FSA.
26 Rachel Frazin, Judge Rejects Trump Administration Challenge to California Cap-and-
Trade Program, HILL (July 17, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/507
887-judge-rejects-trump-administration-challenge-to-california-cap-and [https://perma.cc
/G4AD-5GWT].
27 STEVEN BLEVINS, COUNCIL STATE GOV’TS, CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT AND THE PER-
MISSION FOR STATES TO ENTER INTO INTERSTATE COMPACTS 2 (2011).
28 See HENKIN, supra note 6, at 156–58 (discussing federal preemption).
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would be without any legal effect, a mere political commitment that would
neither purport to constrain the parties nor infringe on federal powers and
thereby not implicate the Compacts Clause while still meeting California’s
intent, namely reducing carbon emissions in both California and Quebec.
I. WHY NOT INFER CONSENT FROM CONGRESSIONAL INACTION?
It is understandable and logical, due to inaction by Congress, that
jurists and scholars have concluded that congressional consent, or more
typically, lack thereof, under the Foreign or singular Compacts Clause
has become meaningless.29 In over 232 years of operation under the Con-
stitution, Congress has only disapproved of an FSA once and has “only
consented to a mere handful.”30 By most estimates, there are currently
hundreds of FSAs, and all of the FSAs that Congress has consented to
fall into “four narrowly defined categories: (a) bridges; (b) firefighting; (c)
highways; and (d) emergency management.”31 Mexico and Canada and
their collective border states and providences are the foreign party to
most of these FSAs.32 Amusingly, or perhaps intentionally provocatively,
California boasts having at least 69 bilateral agreements, with 16 differ-
ent nations, related just to climate issues.33
“The states have concluded more than two hundred FSAs in the
last ten years alone. And these numbers certainly undercount the actual
practice, since no formal mechanisms exist for collecting or monitoring
FSAs.”34 As Glennon and Sloane correctly describe, “the textual ‘default
rule’ . . . has changed by 180 degrees—from one that treats FSAs as
presumptively invalid absent congressional approval to one that regards
them as presumptively valid absent congressional disapproval.”35 If the
Court adopts this approach, consent, under the plain language of the
Compacts Clause, has become a rule without application, because the
courts have generally inferred implied consent to congressional silence.
29 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 283.
30 Hollis I, supra note 4, at 1075.
31 Id. at 1076.
32 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 751.
33 Climate Change Partnerships, CAL.ENERGY COMM’N, https://www.energy.ca.gov/about
/campaigns/international-cooperation/climate-change-partnerships [https://perma.cc/8M
A4-VUTW] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
34 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 744.
35 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 283.
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But what to make of congressional silence? While tempting, it is
a leap to simply argue that the predominant practice of nearly complete
congressional inaction indicates that Congress has forfeited the power of
requiring its consent to FSAs. Even under the framing laid out by Glennon
and Sloane, FSAs not approved or disapproved by Congress would only
be presumptively valid.36 This framing neither negates Congress’s ability
to specifically disapprove at any later time, nor the possibility that an
unapproved (or possibly even an approved) FSA encroaching on another
branch’s power should be invalid.
Like many other areas of actual practice, the source of confusion
is really a story of congressional neglect. However, there are a number of
reasons that could explain Congress’s inaction: 1) lack of knowledge; 2)
intentional implied approval; 3) lack of congressional interest—which is
really a subspecies of implied approval; 4) the proliferation of FSAs is more
than Congress can currently handle; or 5) the topics of “classic” FSAs are
truly local issues that are not within Congress’s power to approve or deny.
There is not currently any reporting requirement or formal mecha-
nism for states to forward FSAs or interstate compacts to Congress.37
Unless a state affirmatively sends an FSA to Congress, there would be
no initiating event causing Congress to act. States would be unlikely,
without required prompting, to forward such agreements sua sponte, and
thereby diminish their political power to make such agreements. Con-
gressional inaction might mean some limited implied consent to the
practice, but due to this lack of a formal protocol, all that can be truly
inferred is that Congress is likely unaware of a majority of agreements.38
While presuming congressional ignorance of the general practice would
be naïve, attributing implied consent without evidence of congressional
knowledge of any individual FSA is another leap of logic altogether.
Thus, lack of specific knowledge of the vast majority of FSAs seems the
most likely reason for much of congressional inaction.
Perhaps, as the Court assumed implied consent in Virginia re-
garding an interstate agreement,39 such consent is just as plausible a
conclusion for FSAs: perhaps unacted upon FSAs are simply agreements
that Congress does not object to. Until the present litigation, no court has
36 Id.
37 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 744.
38 Id. at 796. While a proposal for the shape and nature of future congressional processes
supervising FSAs is beyond the scope of this in writing, I agree with Professor Hollis, that
Congress can and should enact a process for review.
39 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 506 (1893). 
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ever held that the Virginia test applied to FSAs.40 And counter to what
Chief Justice Taney believed the founders’ feared,41 many of the FSAs
have not run contrary to United States foreign policy, but congruent with
it. For example, so-called “Sister City/State” agreements make up many
of the FSAs and were specifically encouraged by the Eisenhower Admin-
istration.42 Plus, the fact that Congress has denied consent only once (in
1968, to the Great Lakes Basin Compact) demonstrates that when Con-
gress sees an FSA that it objects to, it can act.43
Then why ever approve an FSA, if congressional silence already
indicates approval? Congress has affirmatively approved a series of emer-
gency management FSAs, as recently as 2007, 1998, and 1996, respec-
tively.44 While not dispositive, these recent approvals at least demonstrate
Congress’s belief that approval or denial has some effect.
Another possible logical conclusion is congressional indifference to
the substance of most FSAs. While really a subspecies of implied approval,
and logically cutting toward using a test similar to the functional test in
Virginia, many FSAs concern matters that are rather pedestrian: sister
cities, bridges, traffic schemes, and firefighting—matters that would fre-
quently be considered local issues,45 not the high foreign statecraft the
framers may have feared. Based on these agreements, the inference that
could be taken is not that Congress is indifferent to FSAs, but that Con-
gress is indifferent to the substance of most FSAs.
However, the purpose of many FSAs goes beyond simple local
issues. As Hollis describes, “FSAs do far more than deal with bridges,
highways, firefighting, and emergency management.”46 They are used
“(a) to establish a common policy or position; (b) to organize or effectuate
a specific plan or project; (c) to establish an ongoing relationship; or (d)
to impose a regulatory regime.”47 Still, implying consent through a lack
of interest and allowing Congress to forfeit such a clear textual responsi-
bility seems an unappealing argument, especially to the current Supreme
Court, particularly against presidential challenge.
40 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 282.
41 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 573–74 (1840).
42 Hollis I, supra note 4, at 1039.
43 Id. at 1078.
44 See id. at 1077–78. In 2007, the International Emergency Management Assistance Memo-
randum of Understanding; 1998, the Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Arrange-
ment; and 1996, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.
45 See Hollis II, supra note 10, at 754–59.
46 Id. at 754.
47 Id. at 756.
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In recent decades, there has been a dramatic increase in FSAs.48
While unlikely, it would certainly be neater to have a mechanism requiring
states to submit agreements to Congress, much like the Case-Zablocki
Act.49 Then, at least Congress would have knowledge and could perhaps
grant blanket consent to types, subject, or forms of FSAs, or even grant
default consent if an FSA is not acted upon within a given time frame.50
With the proliferation of FSAs in recent decades, having a treaty-
like approval process for every FSA51 would be time consuming. “Earl Fry
has argued that the current swath of agreement making by subnational
entities lies beyond the ability of the national government to ‘control, super-
vise, or even monitor.’”52 If Congress truly wished to be consulted for every
agreement, it would be an incredible logistical burden, but it need not be
an all or nothing process. While I suspect the Court will decide that some
zone of FSAs require consent, Congress ultimately has the legislative power
to scope this zone.53 The increase in FSAs may be a reason to finally act,
but the burden of acting cannot justify the current approach—to imply
consent. It is possible that there are certain subject matters that are beyond
congressional approval or disapproval.54 The Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution gives powers not delegated to the United States to the states,
or the people.55 The Court found differentiation between the “truly na-
tional” and the “truly local” in United States v. Lopez.56 Justice Scalia wrote
in Printz v. United States, a case concerning firearm background checks,
that “it is incontestable that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual
sovereignty’ . . . although the States surrendered many of their powers
to the new Federal Government, they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty.’”57 The functional test in Virginia seems to get at the same
question: perhaps there is a zone for truly local (i.e., state) issues, either
not requiring or perhaps beyond review of Congress?58 But if a matter is
truly local, then the remedy would also seem to be local as well. Yet, the
48 See id. at 744.
49 See 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2004). See also Hollis II, supra note 10, at 800–01.
50 See Hollis II, supra note 10, at 800–01.
51 See id. at 800.
52 Id. (citing EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 128 (1998)).
53 See id. at 795.
54 See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 287–88.
55 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
56 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).
57 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457
(1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); THEFEDERALISTNO. 39 (James Madison)).
58 See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
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Constitution clearly requires congressional consent for all agreements.59
By their very nature, FSAs are meant to have effects external to a state,
not solely within. To say that Congress would have no ability to legislate
a matter that affected a state and a foreign nation is improbable. Per-
haps, as discussed in Part III, when there is congressional silence, a truly
local issue test may be helpful in determining which FSAs could be
presumptively valid. But a power so clearly given to Congress in Article
I cannot be taken away by the Tenth Amendment.
While any congressional action on both interstate agreements and
FSAs is the extreme exception, congressional disapproval of an FSA would
direct a clear result: the agreement would be invalid. Conversely, Congres-
sional approval, over matters solely within its plenary congressional pow-
ers, again would direct a clear result: the agreement would be valid. But
that is a large caveat, for it also seems obvious that Congress could not
approve of an FSA that infringes upon a plenary power of another branch.
The reality is that many of the limited agreements to which Congress has
consented have not infringed on presidential power, but deferred to it.60
While previously discussed, the framers’ differentiation between treaties
and compacts has been lost to time.61 If a state were to execute an agree-
ment that could be characterized as a treaty or that encroaches on the
executive’s powers,62 the President should be able to successfully chal-
lenge such an FSA.63 The courts have shown little interest in distinguish-
ing the difference between treaties and agreements or compacts.64 But
congressional consent should neither save a compact, nor should consent
be implied by congressional inaction if there is true infringement upon
presidential power. If Congress acts unconstitutionally, such an act is
invalid. An “implicitly” approved FSA should be treated no differently.
59 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
60 See Hollis II, supra note 10, at 801–02 (“Congress thus conditioned its approval of trans-
boundary bridges and emergency coordination FSAs on the states obtaining the additional
consent of the State Department.”).
61 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
62 The Complaint is careful not to invoke a “sole-voice” or “sole organ” of foreign affairs
claim, but claims “the Constitution . . . vest[s] authority over foreign affairs in the
President to prohibit actions by the states that lie outside their traditional and localized
areas of responsibility and instead interfere with the federal government’s foreign policy.”
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 31.
63 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 41, 45
(Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1996). Henkin and others have criticized the term “sole organ”
as not “aspir[ing] to legal precision” but there certainly are plenary presidential powers
within foreign affairs that congress or a state could infringe upon.
64 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1978).
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Unrealistically, if California decided to execute a mutual defense
agreement with Quebec (or another matter that would likely be consid-
ered a treaty), that was then, even more unrealistically, approved by Con-
gress, that FSA should be seen as a treaty and should be invalid as an
infringement upon the treaty powers of the President.65 Likewise, even con-
sent implied by congressional silence on an FSA that infringes on presi-
dential plenary powers should likewise be invalid, and judged so, when
challenged by the President. What is unique in the current litigation is not
that a state executed an FSA that Congress has not approved, but that
the President has challenged it as an encroachment of his powers.66 All past
unapproved FSAs are more like the proverbial tree falling in the forest,
with no one around to hear it. Unchallenged FSAs cannot support that the
current practice is valid, only that validity is irrelevant without challenge.
In truth, absolute congressional silence is somewhat rarer than
we are led to believe, as Congress also speaks through legislation. While
the likelihood of both congressional approval of an FSA and legislation on
a connected issue is exceedingly unlikely, considering Congress has only
approved a “handful” of FSAs,67 that situation should be resolved through
an application of the “last in time” doctrine.68 What is likely, though, and
is the case in the current litigation, is that Congress passes legislation ad-
dressing the general subject of an unapproved FSA.69 Then, the federal
legislation should still preempt the FSA.70 Contrary to Murthy’s assertion
that the President “must primarily rely on his own independent consti-
tutional powers, which do not plausibly include emissions trading,”71 when
the President challenges an agreement, he brings with him all of the office’s
plenary powers, as well as all powers delegated to the President by
Congress—Jackson’s first category.72
65 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
66 See Hollis I, supra note 4, at 1091.
67 See Hollis II, supra note 10, at 801.
68 MICHAEL J.GLENNON,CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 233–34 (Princeton Univ. Press 1990).
69 See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 278 (discussing legislative preemption of an
FSA).
70 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 4–5. The complaint makes out in its fourth cause of
action a Foreign Commerce Clause claim. Id. Whether federal law has preempted state
action under both the “Foreign Commerce Clause” as well as other federal environmental
protection legislation might ultimately be highly relevant to the outcome of the litigation,
however the issues of federal preemption are outside the scope of this Article. Neverthe-
less, if there is legislation deemed to have appropriately given the President discretion
of carbon environmental policy, it would be appropriate for the President to challenge the
current FSA using these delegated powers as well. Id.
71 Murthy, supra note 18.
72 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
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II. THERE SHOULD BE A DIFFERENT TEST FOR FSAS AND
INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS
As discussed, the reason for congressional inaction is likely a com-
bination of lack of knowledge, simple disinterest, and the fact that many
FSAs are rather inoffensive. Glennon and Sloane, accurately writing well
before the current litigation, saw the “problem of states endangering the
national interest by making foreign compacts or agreements [as] more
theoretical than real.”73 It is certainly a matter of perspective whether
California’s FSA advances or endangers the “national interest,”74 but now
with direct presidential challenge alleging as much, it is unlikely the
Court will be as willing to embrace such a counter-textualist view as the
functional test, especially when Holmes has never been overruled, and
Virginia is easily distinguishable. This is the type of agreement that the
framers sought to require congressional approval,75 and it is exactly what
the complaint alleges in its second and third causes of action.76 Congres-
sional silence, while probative, is not dispositive of approval when cou-
pled with a colorable allegation of infringement on presidential powers.
Appeals to federalism, and cries of “state’s rights” seem to have swung
wildly along the political spectrum in the last four years, but there was
a fundamental logic of the framers desiring the several States not to
independently pursue each their own foreign policy. The Court should
not find that the functional test from Virginia applies to FSAs as well.
“The Supreme Court has only had one occasion to examine the
Constitution’s conditional prohibition of compacts involving foreign pow-
ers.”77 In Holmes, from 1840, Holmes, a prisoner in Vermont, that Canada
requested extradition of, asked the Court to consider whether the Governor
of Vermont had entered into an unconstitutional agreement with Canada
over his extradition.78 Chief Justice Taney, writing for an evenly divided
court, found that the founders “manifestly believed that any intercourse
between a state and a foreign nation was dangerous to the Union.”79 In
Holmes there was not a written agreement or even clear evidence as to
what that agreement was.80 Advancing a standard more stringent than
73 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 289.
74 Id.
75 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 572 (1840).
76 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.
77 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 779.
78 Holmes, 39 U.S. at 541, 545.
79 Id. at 573–74.
80 Id. at 541.
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I advance today, “Taney found the constitutionality could not turn on the
‘mere form of the agreement’ but rather on the presence or absence of a
‘mutual[] underst[anding].’”81
Relying on Hollis, “even though [Taney’s] opinion did not garner a
majority, it has long been regarded as authoritative.”82 Vermont’s Supreme
Court followed the opinion, releasing Holmes.83 In 1841, the “U.S. Attorney
General . . . issued an opinion that treated Taney’s opinion ‘as law.’”84
United States v. Rauscher concurred with Taney’s views.85 Again, in 1909,
the U.S. Attorney General “similarly invoked Holmes to suggest that the
Constitution ‘prohibits a State from making any kind of an agreement with
a foreign power’ without the consent of Congress.”86 The Supreme Court
has never overruled Holmes; instead, the Court has typically sought to
“reconcile Holmes”87 with rulings on interstate agreements.
What is the test for interstate agreements? Virginia v. Tennessee
is the seminal case for interstate agreements and,88 in dicta, begins the
“functional test” for agreements under the Compacts Clause,89 prohibiting
not all state-made agreements, but only “the formation of any combination
tending to the increase of political power in the states, which may en-
croach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”90
The test from Virginia was further affirmed in New Hampshire v. Maine.91
Northeast Bancorp Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, a dispute over reciprocal banking legislation, laid out the new
“classic indicia of a compact.”92 Citing a lack of these indicia in Northeast
Bancorp, “[n]o joint organization or body has been established to regulate
regional banking or for any other purpose. Neither statute is conditioned
on action by the other State, and each State is free to modify or repeal its
law unilaterally.” The Court noted that “[m]ost importantly, neither
statute requires a reciprocation of the regional limitation.”93 “The Court
did not however, indicate whether each of these criteria needs to exist to
81 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 781 (brackets in original) (citing Holmes, 39 U.S. at 573).
82 Id.
83 Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 642 (1840); Hollis II, supra note 10, at 781.
84 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 781 (citing 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 661, 661 (1841)).
85 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412–14 (1886).
86 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 782 (citing 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 327, 332 (1909)).
87 Id. at 782.
88 See generally Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1893).
89 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 281.
90 Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519.
91 New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976).
92 Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 156, 175 (1985).
93 Id. at 175.
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qualify an arrangement as a compact, or if one or more of them alone
would suffice.”94 The current test for interstate compacts is to look for the
“classic indicia” of a compact or agreement, and then, if found, “evaluate
the need for congressional consent in terms of the effect on federal suprem-
acy.”95 This is the precise logic the district court applied to the California-
Quebec arrangement in the current litigation, finding the “agreement”
is no agreement at all, and even if it is, it would not “encroach upon or
interfere[] with the just supremacy of the United States.”96
The harm targeted in Virginia and affirmed in its progeny con-
front a similar but distinguishable harm than that posed by FSAs.97 The
potential harm of interstate agreements is that collections of states could
increase their own power vis a vis the federal government. One could
imagine an amalgamation of states that could collectively exert undue
influence on the whole Union, greater than the power of the states individ-
ually. The Confederacy during the Civil War presents an obvious, yet
extreme example.98
The colonial history and practice under the Articles of Confedera-
tion apparently demonstrated the purpose of the Compacts Clause to be
so clear that Madison wrote in Federalist 44, the “reasonings [are] either
so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over
without remark.”99 Certainly not all interstate agreements functionally
interfere with federal power, as the courts have never found one that
has.100 The same is not true for FSAs.101 While federal power has never
been absolutely exclusive over the matters that most interstate agree-
ments cover,102 foreign affairs is an area where the courts have been
much more deferential to at least near-exclusivity.103
I am skeptical of the potential harm alleged under the third cause
of action in the DOJ’s complaint, that the Agreement could have the effect
of undermining or complicating the United States’ relations with Canada
if a dispute were to arise between California and Quebec.104 Nevertheless,
94 Hollis I, supra note 4, at 1088.
95 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 767.
96 United States v. California, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1195 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
97 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 282; Hollis II, supra note 10, at 786.
98 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 782.
99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
100 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 281.
101 Id. (Holmes is the only case ever overruling a state made agreement under the Com-
pacts Clause).
102 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 165–67.
103 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).
104 Complaint, supra note 1.
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the notion that FSAs, by their nature, have a far greater likelihood of
infringing upon federal foreign affairs power is clear, as well as the pos-
sibility of foreign powers using states as a vehicle for their own inter-
course with the Unites States.105 The “secret” agreement between Cuba
and Kansas easily demonstrates this point.106 Further, “it seems highly
likely that having ten of fifty U.S. states joining ICAP changed how . . .
foreign government[s] . . . interacted with [the] Bush Administration.”107
While I would not advocate for a position that the states have no
role to play in foreign affairs, the courts have certainly been highly
suspect and held states to a more stringent standard in every other area
of state involvement in foreign affairs.108 Holmes remains the only case
directly addressing FSAs and “suggests that when it comes to FSAs, the
Court has acknowledged a stricter adherence to the constitutional text
than it has held to be required in the interstate context.”109 From Holmes:
The framers of the Constitution manifestly believed that
any intercourse between a state and a foreign nation was
dangerous to the Union; that it would open a door of which
foreign powers would avail themselves to obtain influence
in separate states. Provisions were therefore introduced to
cut off all negotiations and intercourse between the state
authorities and foreign nations.110
Since the harms targeted by the framers between the “Domestic”
and “Foreign” Compacts Clause are different, they deserve different stan-
dards. “From the standpoint of policy there is obviously a vast difference
between interstate compacts and compacts between individual states and
foreign powers.”111 While a functional test might be logical for interstate
105 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 786.
106 Id. at 741 (“On December 9, 2003, Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius quietly con-
cluded an agreement on behalf of her state with Cuba’s food trade agency, Alimport.
Kansas never released the actual text—it came to light via Cuban state radio—but Cuba
apparently committed to buy $10 million in Kansas agricultural products and in return,
Kansas would encourage the repeal of federal trade and travel sanctions against Cuba.
Kansas Lieutenant Governor John Moore publicly came out in support of a bill introduced
in the United States House of Representatives by a Kansas congressman that would have
(if enacted) done just that.”).
107 Id. at 759 (ICAP is the International Carbon Action Partnership).
108 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17, 420.
109 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 782.
110 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 573–74 (1840).
111 The Power of the States to Make Compacts, 31 YALE L.J. 635, 638 (1922).
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agreements, a more stringent one is more appropriate for FSAs and will
certainly be more appealing to the textualists, originalists, and those with
expansive views of presidential power, currently on the Court.112
III. WHAT SHOULD THE TEST BE UNDER THE FOREIGN COMPACTS
CLAUSE?
The best and neatest solution would be for Congress to act directly.
This could take a number of forms, all of which would be an improvement
on current practice.113 The practice the framers likely presumed would
be for Congress to require states to submit all FSAs to Congress, which
would then have to actually approve or disapprove each submission—a
burdensome proposition.114 Another alternative would be to require
notice of all FSAs, coupled with legislation granting consent to certain
domains of agreements, or default consent in certain time frames, if
unacted upon. Again, Congress will always retain the ability to affirma-
tively deny consent to any agreement, on any matter. None of the forgo-
ing is likely to happen in the near term, and the courts will likely be left
to themselves to determine the constitutional application of the Foreign
Compacts Clause.
Regardless of future congressional action on the issues, FSAs do
provide a valuable tool for border states to resolve what would classically
be considered as local issues if the other party were another state, which
would be upheld as interstate agreements under Virginia: cross-border
bridges, traffic schemas, firefighting coordination, etc. Holmes is possibly
distinguishable in that “extradition, historically [is] a subject of national
policy.”115 Absent federal objection or preemption, these truly local agree-
ments should be allowed to continue with Congress always retaining the
ability to disapprove.
For FSAs, courts should look to encroachments upon federal
powers, but in a much stricter application than they currently do for inter-
state agreements. The courts should allow FSAs, within the traditional
local states’ zones of authority, differentiating what is appropriately within
the federal conduct of foreign affairs. This test, while dramatically limit-
ing the current scope of FSAs, would still allow states to function in the
112 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 785 (“Even if both Compact Clauses perform the same
function—i.e., protecting federal supremacy—they do so in distinct ways.”).
113 See supra discussion in Part I; see also Hollis II, supra note 10, at 800.
114 See Holmes, 39 U.S. at 573–74.
115 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 154.
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face of congressional silence and at least make a colorable argument of
implied consent based on prior congressionally approved FSAs.
Many FSAs, such as the Manitoba-Missouri watershed agreement
and the Great Lakes agreements,116 might seem, based on subject matter,
to be the type of truly local issues that could be presumed valid, but as
soon as multiple states are involved, such as with agreements involving
precious resources like the water sheds of large rivers, these logically
should fall within the federal domain.117 When a common issue affects
multiple states and a foreign government, that should be considered a
federal foreign affairs issue, which the President and Congress are con-
stitutionally empowered to control in order to avoid the divergent foreign
policies that framers meant to prevent,118 potentially causing states to
enter a bidding war with a foreign government. This application would
function not as a wholesale cessation of current FSAs, but limit them in
a manner much closer to the text of the Constitution. Rather than being
functional, this would look to the subject matter of the FSA, looking to
traditional canons of federal and state power.
This test would allow the type of cross-border FSAs that are less
likely to offend federal powers and are necessary for smooth operation
and good governance in border communities. However, it would be highly
suspect of agreements made by multiple states, non-border states, or
with nations or subdivisions of nations that do not border—such as the
California-Quebec agreement, and topics that are outside more limited,
truly local issues—like climate change. Congress would always retain the
power to disapprove, or preempt with legislation, and the executive
should be able to challenge those that infringe on executive powers:
plenary, concurrent, and powers delegated to the executive by Congress.
This Foreign Compacts Clause test would limit agreements that encroach
on federal powers, be far closer to a textual reading of the Constitution,
and allow the executive to selectively challenge offensive FSAs.
Hollis advocates for an even stricter reading of the Foreign Com-
pacts Clause to apply across the entire spectrum of possible agreements
made by states, from the binding treaty-like documents to mere political
116 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 759, 742 n. 12; Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
117 Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements between States and between States and
a Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219 230 (1952) (“[A]lmost any compact of importance
is bound to affect the power balance between the states and the Federal Government and
hence could be considered political in nature, the states contemplating the making of a
compact would be wise to include a provision for Congressional consent.”).
118 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 770.
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commitments.119 The Holmes court appears to go as far.120 However, I
would not advocate this new application to political commitments, “memo-
randums of understanding,” or concurrent statements of intentions that
do not purport to confirm legal binding terms or obligations on either party,
that do not include “shall”-like terms, and do not have withdrawal time
frames or notification of withdrawal provisions. While the courts have
certainly held the federal government’s powers in the foreign domain to be
extensive, the courts have never gone so far as to say that the federal gov-
ernment’s power is exclusive, especially in instances of federal silence.121
The test I recommend for FSAs is as follows: 1) is there an agree-
ment? Applying a more expansive view of compacts than the current
“classic indicia” from Northeast Bancorp,122 for interstate agreements,
but not as restrictive as Holmes,123 looking to the language of the agree-
ment, but not including mere concurrent political commitments. Then,
2) is the matter truly a local issue of the type that Congress has previ-
ously approved, or does it involve multiple states or a matter normally
outside border state concerns and therefore encroaches on federal pow-
ers? And then, even if the matter is truly local 3) has there been a legiti-
mate federal objection? This final prong should be present, because the
plain language of the Constitution clearly gives Congress the power to
consent, and even when there is congressional silence, foreign affairs are
more appropriately the providence of the President than the states.124 As
discussed, when Congress affirmatively denies consent, the matter would
be easily decided against the FSA. The executive’s objection, however,
would need to demonstrate that the subject of the FSA infringes on a
presidential power. For litigation over FSAs that are truly local, when
initiated by private parties, federal preemption would need to be dem-
onstrated—the federal government is a “victim” of unapproved FSAs, not
private parties.
The current Court should find this approach more appealing when
dealing with FSAs than the Virginia and Northeast Bancorp test for
interstate agreements.125 While most provisions of the Constitution are
never as clear as lay readers of the text might infer, strict “textualism”
119 Id. at 791–93.
120 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 573–74 (1840).
121 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418–20 (2003).
122 March 12th Ruling, supra note 21, at 28.
123 Holmes, 39 U.S. at 572.
124 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418–20.
125 March 12th Ruling, supra note 21, at 28.
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or even “originalism” seem the providence of a political ideology that is
more inclined to look backwards than toward a progressing, functioning
democracy. This proposed test would move away from the “180 degree”126
opposite application currently assumed to apply, toward one that conforms
with a plainer reading, while still retaining a carve-out for states to act in
a very limited local zone, while also allowing the current federal practice—
overwhelming disinterest. Absolute congressional control over all FSAs
would remain, as well as a voice for the executive when presidential
powers are encroached.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE MAJORITY VIEW OF A
SINGLE COMPACTS CLAUSE
Professor Murthy (writing before the district court virtually con-
curred in totality with her analysis)127 is highly suspect of the viability of
the government’s complaint,128 stating, “the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit states from engaging in activities that could impact foreign
affairs.”129 I agree, technically; however, as discussed, the Constitution
does expressly prohibit “without the consent of Congress” a state from
“enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign power.”130
Further, Murthy is correct when she continues, “states like California
have long engaged in cross-border activity.”131 While true, the practice
has heretofore never been contested, and the question is much more in
doubt if the Supreme Court, particularly the current Court, will approve
of a practice that so clearly functions in opposition to the plain text of the
Constitution and the intent of the framers, no matter how long or how
often states have been making FSAs without congressional consent.
The history of federal inaction “has created the ‘grey zone’ of foreign
affairs federalism into which states like California have stepped.”132 But
to whom does unused congressional foreign affairs powers flow? While
informative, longstanding practices cannot overcome such an obvious
textual disconnection, particularly when there is colorable federal objec-
tion. It seems that the President’s concurrent powers are more likely
126 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 283.
127 See March 12th Ruling, supra note 21, at 2, 33.
128 See Murthy, supra note 18, at 1, 3, 5.
129 Id. at 1.
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
131 Murthy, supra note 18, at 1.
132 Id.
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encroached by state action in the face of congressional silence in foreign
affairs.133 Murthy relies on the commonly assumed application of the
Virginia functional test for interstate agreements applying to FSAs as
well.134 If true, as the district court held,135 her analysis is sound. However,
while a bulk of scholars make this assumption,136 the few that have seri-
ously considered the matter, question the certainty of this assumption.137
Murthy goes on, posing, “The California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade
Agreement is largely consistent with prior acts of Congress. As a result,
President Trump must rely on his own independent constitutional powers,
which do not plausibly include emissions trading.”138 The President can
always rely on his “independent constitutional powers,”139 and the com-
plaint does “engage[] in a sleight of hand” attempting to “re-cast[] the
Cap-and-Trade Agreement as a national security issue.”140 But Congress
created the Clean Air Act,141 as well as other environmental legislation
that Congress delegated at least some authorities to the President and
the EPA Administrator.142 Despite the debate concerning presidential
authority over independent executive agencies, the President also brings
delegated powers as well as plenary powers. While the Clean Air Act
does preserve states’ ability “to implement stricter air pollution stan-
dards,”143 the fact that the method California chose was an FSA with
Quebec likely puts it outside the permissible action under the Act and
unconstitutionally encroaches on federal powers. “The Supreme Court
has found that a federal regulation barred even identical, consistent, or
supplementary state regulations because the federal government ‘occu-
pied the field.’”144
133 GLENNON, supra note 68, at 15–16.
134 Murthy, supra note 18, at 1–2, 4–5.
135 March 12th Ruling, supra note 21, at 28, 33.
136 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 282.
137 See id. at 281–82; see generally Hollis I, supra note 4, at 1086; and Hollis II, supra note
10, at 762–63.
138 Murthy, supra note 18, at 1.
139 Id. at 2.
140 Id. at 1.
141 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1990).
142 There is significant debate surrounding what authorities the President has over in-
dependent executive agencies. See Christopher D. Ahlers, Presidential Authority Over EPA
Rulemaking Under the Clean Air Act, 44 ENV’T L. 31–32, 34–35, 46 (2014). This debate
at least exposes that there is the possibility of some powers delegated to the president.
143 Murthy, supra note 18.
144 California v. ARC American Corp, 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989); HENKIN, supra note 6, at
157 (“In such cases, the Court avoids finding that the state action violates some implied
substantive provision: it finds instead a purpose in the federal regulation to exclude the
48 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:29
Finally, contrary to Murthy’s argument, if the court were to rule
against California, it would not create a “domino effect.”145 The practice
of states and the federal government would likely not change dramati-
cally. First, it is unlikely that the executive would begin challenging the
hundreds of current FSAs, just as Congress has shown no interest in
actually reviewing the hundreds of current FSAs. Further, if the test I
advocate is adopted, many, if not most, FSAs would not be determined
to be compacts requiring congressional consent absent federal challenge.
Finally, truly local FSAs that directly impact the functioning of border
states (i.e., roads, bridges, emergency services) would still be permissible
under a limited zone of truly local state authority.
V. CALIFORNIA CAN MOOT THE LITIGATION BY EXECUTING A
NON-BINDING POLITICAL COMMITMENT
Ultimately, the current administration’s opposition to addressing
climate change, specifically carbon emissions, is unfortunate, and Califor-
nia’s attempts to engage on the issue are morally laudable; however, it
does not seem that the Supreme Court will be as permissive. Assuming
that the Court would not adopt the strictest standard, advocated by
Hollis,146 requiring congressional approval of all FSAs, including mere
political commitments, California should be able to moot the current
litigation by executing a new “agreement” with Quebec that would escape
scrutiny under the Compacts Clause altogether as a non-binding political
commitment.147
In 2009, California and Quebec executed a prior agreement that
was much more binding in nature than the current 2017 agreement.148
According to the 2017 agreement, the parties were replacing a 2013
agreement.149 The drafting history explaining the differences between the
2009 agreement and the 2017 agreement are unknown. More binding
state, and places the onus for invalidating state law on the federal political branches.”)
(citing Hines v. Davidowitiz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940)).
145 Murthy, supra note 18.
146 Hollis II, supra note 10, at 796.
147 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 5, at 287.
148 See generally Attachment B of Complaint, United States v. State of California et al.,
No. 2:19-cv-02142 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019) [hereinafter 2017 Agreement].
149 See generally CAL. AIR RES. BD., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES
BOARD AND THE GOUVERNMENT DU QUÉBEC CONCERNING THE HARMONIZATION AND IN-
TEGRATION OF CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS,
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic//cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_link
ing_agreement_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY33-TGRN] [hereinafter 2009 Agreement].
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language, like “shall,” is used less than in the 2009 agreement, but still
present.150 While the 2017 agreement’s withdrawal clause drops the 2009
agreement’s 12-month waiting period and seems to indicate either party
may unilaterally withdraw, it confusingly maintains the original’s “unani-
mous consent of the Parties” to terminate the agreement.151 While not
dispositive, this unanimous termination requirement, coupled with the
multiple uses of the term “shall,” indicates that the parties did intend
something more binding than a political commitment.152
Without conducting a line-by-line recommendation for a new agree-
ment, it seems the parties could execute an entirely non-binding political
commitment, at a minimum, changing the name from “agreement” to
“understanding.” While a name alone will not be dispositive (“a rose [b]y
any other name. . . .”),153 calling the document an “agreement” certainly
undercuts arguments that it is not an “agreement.” Likewise, changing
“shall” to “intend” or other synonymous terms, with lesser connotations
of commitment, and allowing unilateral withdrawal and termination with
an “endeavor” or “efforts” to provide 12-months’ notice will shift the tone
toward a non-binding understanding.154 With these changes, while still
likely to offend the Trump administration, such a document would likely
be non-violative of all but the strictest possible readings of the Compacts
Clause and be consistent with the Court’s current practice of allowing
states some limited space to speak in foreign affairs.
Another option would be to throw out the agreement altogether
and for California to simply act unilaterally, setting a floor for regulatory
standards, with a reciprocity requirement much like the structure found
in Northeast Bancorp,155 in which any foreign or domestic jurisdiction’s,
including Quebec’s, carbon credits matching California’s regulatory mini-
mums, where California credits could also be bought as an offset, could
reciprocally be purchased as an offset to California emissions. From a
Compacts Clause perspective, how could there be a violation if there is
not an even an agreement for Congress not to consent to?156
150 2017 Agreement, supra note 148.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, l. 43–44 (1597).
154 David Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN
L.J. 507, 527 (2017).
155 Northeast Bancorp Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 164–78
(1985).
156 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 573–74 (1840) (The court Holmes might still find
such a structure violative of the Compacts Clause.).
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CONCLUSION
The current administration’s hostility to the realities of climate
change are unfortunate and Congress’s inaction is unsurprising. The
majority of states’ practices in both interstate agreements and FSAs has
essentially gone unregulated for most of the history of the United States.
Having never found an interstate agreement violative of the Compacts
Clause, the Supreme Court has implied congressional consent when there
has been none. Due to the parallel construction of the Compacts Clause,
most scholars have understandably assumed that the functional test
coming from Virginia applies to FSAs as well, but the Court has never
held so.
I find it exceedingly unlikely that the current Court will be as
willing to assume implied congressional consent from congressional silence
to California’s cap and trade agreement with Quebec, in the face of the
clear text of the Compacts Clause. First, lack of knowledge to most FSAs
is more likely than consent, and I encourage Congress to enact some re-
view process.
Further, interstate agreements are distinguishable from FSAs in
a number of ways. First, the harm the framers intended to prevent for
FSAs is different than that of interstate agreements. Second, the subjects
of FSAs are more likely to infringe on the generally recognized, near-ex-
clusivity of the federal government. Finally, the history of unchallenged
FSAs only demonstrates that they were unchallenged, not that they are
presumptively valid.
The Kansas-Cuba agreement demonstrates the danger of states
executing their own separate foreign policies: the potential to damage a
fundamental idea of the Constitution, that we are better acting collectively
than separately, especially in foreign affairs. Even efforts to achieve a
“correct” objective could still have unforeseen consequences.157
There is only one time that an FSA has been challenged, and the
Court invalidated that agreement because of lack of congressional con-
sent.158 Therefore, to provide clarity and limit future confusion surround-
ing FSAs, I encourage the Court to clearly establish a separate test under
the Foreign Compacts Clause, one that is in closer keeping with text of
the Constitution, while allowing a zone for truly local action.
157 See Hollis II, supra note 10.
158 Holmes, 39 U.S. at 570 (“According to the express words of the Constitution, [treaty
negotiation] is one of the powers that states are forbidden to exercise without the consent
of Congress.”).
